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Abstract 
The aim of this research was to identify the influence that corporate governance               
characteristics of a firm have on the quality of financial information provided to its      
stakeholders, specifically for Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark). Analysis 
was performed based on firm-level secondary data. The main research objective was to 
ascertain whether there exist potential causal relationships between the characteristics of 
a firm’s board of directors and the executive team, and the respective amount of           
discretionary accruals, which is used as a measure of the quality of financial information – 
a high discretionary accrual amount representing lower financial information quality. 
Theoretical and empirical literature was collected from diverse literature including        
research articles, corporate reports and statements, regulatory reports and papers       
published by professional organizations. Compiled secondary data, on the other hand, 
were obtained from the audited annual statements and reports of the chosen 62 publicly 
listed firms in Finland, Sweden and Denmark for the fiscal year of 2015. SPSS program was 
used to do both descriptive and inferential analysis using the data in order to identify 
causal relationships between the variables involved.  
The result indicated that the ratio of performance pay to fixed pay of an executive team    
significantly and positively affects the amount of discretionary accruals at the firm level, 
thus lowering the quality of financial data. Furthermore, the experience of board members 
serving in a firm affects the quality of financial reporting adversely. Several other control 
variables also affect the amount of discretionary accruals, such as the number of other 
directorship positions a firm board member holds in other firms (positive relationship) and 
the education background of the board members (negative relationship). 
Keywords/tags (subjects)  
Quality of financial reporting, Quality of accounting information, Corporate governance, 
Earnings management, Discretionary accruals, Jones model  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Accountancy is the art of presenting financial information on the performance of a 
business entity to its stakeholders in the form of financial statements. The             
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) defines financial statements as 
the documents that provide information regarding the financial position,                
performance, and the capability of a firm that is useful to a variety of users in making 
economic decisions (Elliot and Elliot 2011, 22-23). The quality of financial information 
published by a firm can be assessed through various measures, such as the            
persistence of its earnings, accrual amounts, firm characteristics, corporate           
governance and controls, choice of accounting policies, etc. However, the quality of 
information is, in general, considered high if it represents the actual economic      
condition of the firm fairly using relevant and reliable data. But, due to the choice of 
accounting methods, managers are usually given considerable amount of discretion 
when preparing financial statements, which may, in some cases be misused in order 
to create short-term personal gains or assumed overall gains. This process of         
misreporting financial information is known as ”Earnings management”. Earnings 
management can be done by various means, such as, changes in a firm’s capital 
structure, changes in the accounting methods, and the use of accruals – specifically, 
the discretionary accruals (Jones model 1991, 206). Xie (2001) showed that one could 
measure the quality of earnings presented by a firm more accurately by eliminating 
the ”normal” or non-discretionary accruals from the equation, since these can be 
linked to the macro-economic conditions in the market and hence be justified.      
Discretionary accruals are one of the most commonly used and efficient measures of 
detecting earnings management. Hence, in this research, the focus is placed on the 
use of accruals, specifically – discretionary accruals, as the source of earnings      
management.  
Earnings management is a phenomenon that is influenced by various factors related 
to the corporate governance practices of a firm. There is extensive literature on the 
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relationships between the characteristics of board of directors and the executive 
team and related factors, and earnings management incidences. However, the     
results of these researches are mixed – providing positive as well as negative         
relationships between corporate governance characteristics and earnings            
management. Therefore, further research on this subject is important in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, which was one of the major      
motivations for conducting this research. This led to the hypotheses to be tested 
through this research, the most important one being that the discretionary accruals 
of a firm are influenced by certain characteristics of the board of directors and the 
executive team members, and their remuneration.  
The relevant hypotheses were formed after reviewing a variety of literature, both 
theoretical and empirical. These hypotheses were tested by analyzing the secondary 
data collected from 62 major publicly listed firms from Finland, Sweden, and      
Denmark. These data were compiled data that consisted of the financial figures    
involved in the calculation of discretionary accruals and the characteristics of board 
of directors of the chosen companies. Subsequently, both descriptive and inferential 
data analyses were performed in order to develop a better understanding of the  
association between the corporate governance characteristics of firms and            
discretionary accruals.  
The analyses showed that the ratio of performance pay to fixed pay of executive 
team members significantly and positively affects the amount of discretionary      
accruals at the firm level. According to the underlying assumption that a higher    
discretionary accrual amount represents lower quality of financial reporting, this 
finding represents a negative relationship between the performance pay of the    
executive team members and the quality of financial reporting of the respective firm. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the experience of board members serving in a 
firm affects the quality of financial reporting adversely. The effect of several other 
control variables has also been studied, such as the number of directorships held in 
other firms by the firm board members and the education background of firm board 
members affect discretionary accruals positively and negatively respectively.  
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1.2 Motivation  
The author’s motivation behind this research was formed by the tremendous interest 
in the field of finance in general and the chosen topic in particular. The topic was 
introduced to the author by his thesis tutor and finance lecturer - Shabnamjit Hundal. 
Since the author wants to pursue a career in the finance industry, specifically in the 
financial markets, the topic appealed to his interest. Financial reports play a major 
role in the financial markets, and the importance of their quality cannot be more 
emphasized. The quality of financial reporting has been cause of concern to a variety 
of market players and regulators all over the world, however not much research has 
been done on this topic in Nordic countries. Therefore, with such research          
background, the relevance of the current study is even more significant.  
1.3 Research questions 
An extensive literature on the quality of financial reporting, characteristics of high 
quality earnings and the factors influencing the two has been generated in the last 
couple of decades. However, not much research has been in done in the same area 
taking Nordic countries into consideration. This led to the first research question 
concerning publicly listed firms in Nordic countries, specifically in Finland, Sweden, 
and Denmark:  
1. Which characteristics of a board of directors influence the quality of              
accounting information provided by the firm to its stakeholders?  
 
Although earnings management has been a concern for a long time, very little      
evidence of the same has been generated by academics, as documented by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999). In a publicly listed company, the board of directors must approve 
the financial statements, therefore, the characteristics of the board of directors may 
influence the financial reporting quality. Different researchers use different         
techniques to examine the quality of accounting information provided by a firm. In 
order to identify the various methods used to measure the quality of accounting             
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information and find out the most efficient one, the second research question was 
formed: 
2. How is the quality of accounting information measured?  
 
Once the factors of corporate governance that influence the quality of financial    
information provided by firms have been identified, it is important to study the 
mechanism through which the quality of accounting information provided by firms 
can be enhanced. Hence, the last research question was as follows:  
3. What are the imperatives of enhancing the quality of accounting information? 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis has been divided into 5 main chapters, the first one being the 
”Theoretical Background”, which builds a theoretical background for the reader by          
explaining the key concepts discussed in the research. The second chapter “Empirical 
Literature Review” includes the results and findings of already existing research on 
the quality of financial reporting and its imperatives. The third chapter              
”Methodology” describes the research approach and methods applied during the 
research in order to collect and analyze data. It also lays down the main research 
questions for this study. The fourth chapter i.e. ”Results” states the findings of the 
analyses performed on the data. These findings have been divided into two parts – 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis results. The fifth and last chapter of this 
thesis is the ”Discussion”, which examines the previously mentioned results in detail 
and explains the outcomes while comparing them to existing literature i.e. the results 
of previously conducted researches on the similar subject. At the end, the list of   
references used to collect data for this thesis has been provided along with the    
appendices that mainly show the collected data and the results of the analysis. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Financial statements and discretionary accruals 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) defines financial       
statements as the documents that provide information regarding the financial      
position, performance, and the capability of a firm that is useful to a variety of users 
in making economic decisions. In 2007, the IASC stated that a public firm needs to 
provide all of the following statements:  
• A statement of financial position at the end of the period 
• A statement of comprehensive income for the period 
• A statement of changes in equity for the period 
• A statement of cash flows for the period 
• Notes comprising a summary of important accounting policies adopted by the 
firm and other explanatory information. 
(Elliot and Elliot 2011, 22-23.) 
There are two basic methods of accounting that are employed by firms to report 
their incomes and expenses – cash accounting and accrual accounting. Under cash 
accounting, earnings are recorded when the payment has been received and         
expenses are recorded when a payment has been made. On the other hand, under 
accrual accounting, earnings and expenses are not recorded when the payment has 
been made or received, but rather when the transaction happens (good or services 
are delivered or a sale is made). Hence, accruals are either the income that has been 
earned but not yet recorded or expenses that have been incurred but not yet       
recorded. According to Tudor and Mutiu (1990, 1-2), accrual based accounting is a 
more efficient method because it represents a better picture of the current income, 
due to which the balance sheet (also known as the statement of financial position) is 
more accurate. Also, it is a better indicator of a firm’s present and future cash      
generating abilities since it requires the financial statements not just to present the       
receipts and payments made but also the future cash outflows and inflows in the 
future. (ibid., 51.)  
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Dechow, Khimich, and Sloan (2001) demonstrated that if a company has high      
earnings in a particular period, one could expect it to have reasonably high earnings 
in the future as well. According to Cheng and Warfield (2005, 7), Stein (1989, 657) 
argued that ”… the stock market uses earnings to make a rational forecast of firm 
value – higher earnings today will be correlated with higher earnings in the future.” 
However, it is important to notice whether the earnings are mostly driven by actual 
cash flows or accruals; if accruals form the major part of the earnings, it is much less 
likely that the earnings will remain high in the upcoming period. Dechow and        
colleagues hypothesized that investors are highly fixated on a firm’s earnings,       
regardless of a firm having relatively high accruals. Further, they validated this      
hypothesis by showing that the returns on a high accrual portfolio were abnormally 
low, indicating that investors could not anticipate the consequences of a firm having 
high accrual amounts. This phenomenon is known as ”accrual anomaly”. Since      
auditors are meant to present a realistic picture of a firm’s economic condition and 
inspect the quality of financial reporting, they should be able to identify the presence 
of high accruals in a firm’s statements. However, Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 
(2001) did not find any evidence of auditor changes in the financial statements of 
high accrual firms. According to Dechow and colleagues, Lev and Nissim (2006) found 
that some institutional investors identify the existence of accrual anomaly and try to 
arbitrage it. However, the magnitude of this is very low.  
Accrual accounting gives management some discretion when it comes to estimating 
cash flows. Managers have discretion when it comes to estimating the expected lives 
of long-term assets, choosing the type of depreciation calculation method,            
estimating the receivables, deferred taxes, research and development expenditure 
needs, inventory levels to be maintained, etc. (Even though this flexibility can allows 
to more accurate information to be presented by solving the timing and mismatching 
issues related to cash flows, it can also be misused by managers to take opportunistic 
steps. Due to the flexible nature of accrual accounting, accruals can be divided into 
two types – discretionary and non-discretionary. Discretionary accruals can be  
measured using Jones model (1991), which uses a regression model to first calculate 
non-discretionary accruals and then requires the subtraction of non-discretionary 
accruals from the total accrual amount. (Subramanyam 1996, 250-251.) Xie (2001) 
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showed that one could measure the quality of earnings presented by a firm more 
accurately by eliminating the ”normal” or non-discretionary accruals from the    
equation, since these can be linked to the macro-economic conditions in the market 
and hence be justified. The most common components of financial statements that 
display earnings manipulation (high discretionary accruals) are the inventory and 
accounts receivable. Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2006) found that firms 
with high accruals (representing a high likelihood of earnings manipulation) are more 
likely to have allegations against them by the SEC for overstating their earnings    
figure. Dechow et al. (13-18.) 
Jones’ model of discretionary accruals 
Jones model is one of the most reliable methods to calculate discretionary accruals. 
In some models that separate the discretionary portion of total accruals from the 
non-discretionary one, it is assumed that the non-discretionary portion of accruals is 
constant throughout the period. However, Jones model does not incorporate in itself 
the similar assumption. Jennifer Jones’ model attempts to control for the impact of 
changes in the economic circumstances on non-discretionary accruals. (Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney 1995, 198.) In order to do so, Jones (1991) uses the following    
assumption model for total accruals of a firm:  
TAit/Ait-1 = β0 (1/Ait-1) + β1 (ΔREVit/Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + ԑit 
where: 
TAit = total accruals in year t (current year) for firm i; 
ΔREVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t – 1 (previous year) for firm i;  
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i;  
Ait-1 = total assets in year t -1 for firm i;  
ԑit = error term in year t for firm i; 
β0, β1, β2 = Beta coefficients (representing firm specific parameters) 
The variables used in the formula above are described below: 
• Total Assets (A) = Current assets + Fixed assets  
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Mirza, Orrell, and Holt (2008, 10) define an asset as a resource in control of the entity 
as a result of past events and from which economic benefits are expected to be    
received by the entity in the future. Total assets comprise of current assents (e.g. 
cash, receivables, etc.) and fixed assets (property, plant and equipment, goodwill, 
etc.).  
• Change in revenue or net sales (ΔREV) = Net sales in current year – Net sales 
in previous year 
Net sales is the amount received by the sale of goods and services after deduction of 
returns and discounts made to the customers.  
• PPE = Gross Property + Gross Plants + Gross Equipment 
PPE refers to a company’s tangible assets that are necessary for business operations. 
These assets are relatively less liquid than current assets and are mostly used in   
production and supply of goods and services, administration purposes or for rental 
purposes. (ibid., 108.)  
• Error term (ԑ): This is the prediction of the discretionary accruals of a firm in 
an ideal world. This value may or may not be very different from the actual 
estimate of discretionary accruals.  
• Total Accruals (TA) = Change in assets – Change in liabilities – Change in cash 
[Balance sheet method] 
Or 
• Total Accruals (TA) = Profit after tax – Cash earnings [Cash flow statement 
method] 
Accruals are defined as the income that has been earned but not yet recorded or 
expenses that have been incurred but not yet recorded.  
Profit after tax refers to the net amount of profits earned by a company after       
deducting all the expenses occurred before, during, and after sales and the taxes 
paid.  
 A liability is a present obligation of a company or an individual that arises from past 
events and is to be settled in the future resulting in an outflow of resources. (ibid.) 
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Total liabilities are the sum of short-term (e.g. payables, accrued expenses,         
short-term loans, etc.) and long-term liabilities (e.g. bonds, long-term loans, etc.).  
Cash refers to the amount of money held by the company but not deposited in the 
bank.  
Cash Earnings refers to the income that has been generated in the form of cash as a 
result of sale of goods and/or services.  
The model for total accruals presented above is used to calculate the beta             
coefficients (β0, β1, β2) by regressing the equation in SPSS or other data analysis   
programs. Total Net Accruals are scaled by total assets in the previous year in order 
to reduce the effect of firm size on the results. After having received the values for 
the beta coefficients, the following formula is used to calculate the non-discretionary 
accruals:  
NDA (Non-discretionary accruals) / Ait-1 = β0(1/Ait-1) + β1(ΔREV) + β2(PPE / Ait-1 ) 
Once the non-discretionary accruals have been calculated, discretionary accruals can 
be calculated by subtracting non-discretionary accruals from the total net accruals 
i.e. Discretionary accruals (DA) = Total net accruals (TA) – Non-discretionary accru-
als (NDA) (Jones 1991, 211-212.)  
Dechow et al. (1995) state that Jones model and the modified version of Jones model 
are the most powerful models to detect earnings management via the estimation of 
discretionary accruals of a firm within a given period of time (215).   
2.2 Agency theory 
The firm owners (or shareholders) are not in direct control of all the activities      
conducted by the managers; this is where the role of board of directors is vital. A 
board of directors appoints and advises the top-level management on various       
corporate issues and decisions. (Brealy, Myers, and Allen 2011, 5.) However, people 
are, by nature, self-interested, and due to this, whenever they engage in mutual  
endeavors, there is a high probability of conflict of interests arising (Jensen 1994, 13). 
This conflict of interest, when exists between managers & shareholders, leads to 
agency problems. Agency problems occur as a result of agency relationships. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as ”a contract under which one or 
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more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent.” (5). Agency theory looks at the implications of an agency relationship. If 
all the parties involved in a relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good chance 
that the agent might not act in the best interest of the principal. In order to avoid this 
situation, the principal can offer appropriate incentives to the agent and thus incur 
monitoring expenses to keep the agent from following unethical practices.             
Furthermore, in some cases, an agent might consume unnecessary resources as a 
guarantee to the principal in an attempt to gain their trust (also knows as bonding 
cost). These costs are known as agency costs. In addition to these costs, agency costs 
also comprise of a ”residual loss”, which is the additional cost incurred on top of the 
monitoring and bonding costs. (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 5.) 
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2009, 1087-1111) mention that board members 
with multiple directorships may become overcommitted and hence the quality of 
monitoring may be compromised. This is also known as “Business hypothesis”. Board 
members have rewards for serving on multiple boards; holding multiple directorship 
positions makes board members more visible and enhances their status in the     
business community. However, firms might be skeptical about hiring a director who 
has multiple board positions in other companies due to their busyness.  
2.3 Information asymmetry & Earnings management  
According to Richardson (1998, 1-5), managers have an access to private information 
about the firm and its earnings, which might not be available to the shareholders. 
This is called ”information asymmetry”. This asymmetry can manifest itself in the 
form of financial reports published by a firm. Consequently, when information 
asymmetry is high, stakeholders (or shareholders) are unable to verify whether the 
published information represents the actual economic condition of the firm or not. 
This may lead to earnings management. As stated by Dechow and Skinner (2000, 1-
5.), Schipper (1998, 92) defines earnings management as ”… a purposeful               
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process)…”. And an extreme form of earnings management, financial fraud, can be 
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defined as ”the deliberate misinterpretation of the financial condition of an           
enterprise accomplished through the intentional misstatement or omission of 
amounts or disclosures in the financial statements to deceive financial statement 
users.”  
Trueman and Titman (1988) and Dye (1988) state that analytical models have      
identified the necessity of the presence of information symmetry for earnings    
management to take place. However, this research lacked any empirical evidence, 
which was then provided by Richardson, showing the positive relationship between 
measures of information symmetry and earnings management. (Richardson 1998, 1-
5.) 
Lev (1988) suggested the use of bid-ask spreads to judge the presence of information 
symmetry among the equity market participants. The bid-ask spread is the difference 
between the price at which an equity dealer sells an asset and the price at with the 
dealer buys the asset (Brealy, Myers, and Allen 2011, 48). The validity of this metric 
was confirmed by Healy, Palepu, and Sweaney (1995) and Welker (1995), who      
reported the negative relationship between the bid-ask spread and the firm’s       
disclosure policy. (ibid., 6.) 
Another measure of information symmetry was provided by Healy and colleagues as 
the dispersion among analysts’ forecasts. Brown and Han (1992) proposed that the 
consensus among analysts over the future performance of a firm increases as the 
information symmetry decreases, and vice-versa. Since the future performance of a 
firm is partially estimated by interpreting the published financial reports, it is clear 
that the ambiguity in the information provided will make way for different future 
judgements about the firm’s performance. (ibid., 6-7.)  
Earnings management can be practiced even within the confines of accounting 
standards such as the IFRS or the GAAP. This is because the legislation behind these 
standards asks for the discretion of managers in various circumstances. Therefore, 
the evidence of earnings management is hard to be proven as conclusive, given that 
the decision making might be in line with the actual firm circumstances or on the 
other hand, an attempt to manipulate the information for personal gains. (Dechow 
and Skinner 2000, 5-6.)  
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Academics have mostly had the opinion that earnings management is not a major 
concern to be looked after, because with time, the market realizes the actual value 
of a security and corrects itself, which is in line with the efficient market theory. 
However, practitioners tend to disagree with this line of thought. Furthermore,    
academics believe that if all the necessary reasoning behind the reported figures on 
the financial statements is provided under the footnotes of the report, it does not 
count as earnings management, since the user has all the information to make an 
informed decision. But practitioners and regulators believe that not all information 
users (market participants/investors) have the required knowledge or material     
resources to access and understand the detailed information provided separate from 
the financial statements themselves. (Dechow and Skinner 2000, 8.) 
2.4 Accounting standards and quality of financial reporting 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1998, 1) accounting standards act as a common  
accounting language that can be enforced by independent auditors and the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) on publicly listed firms. They provide corporate        
managers with a relatively low-cost and reliable means of conveying private          
information on the performance of their respective firms to external financers and 
other stakeholders. In 2005, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
introduced the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since then, all  
publicly listed companies in the European Union are required to follow the IFRS while 
reporting their financial information. The purpose behind the introduction of IFRS 
was to ensure that same standards applied to companies all over the world equally. 
(Ball, 1-2.) However, the IFRS are principles-based, which allows accountants and 
auditors to follow general guidelines instead of specific rules, leaving them with 
some discretion to adapt the principles to specific situations. (Soderstrom and Sun 
2007, 690.) 
Elliot and Elliot (2011) mention that standards are needed because accounting   
numbers are vital when defining contractual entitlements. For example, the          
remuneration of directors and managers might be expressed in terms of a salary plus 
a bonus based on an agreed performance measure such as the net operating profit 
or the net income of the firm. Mandatory standards are necessary in order to avoid 
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subjectivity from the reporting of financial information in the form of published 
statements. Financial reporting then helps enable the best-performing firms in the 
economy to distinguish themselves from the poor performers and allows for efficient 
allocation of physical and intangible resources and stewardship decisions by      
stakeholders.  
Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2007) state that accounting standards can increase the 
quality of reporting by assisting in estimating amounts that better represent the   
underlying economics of the firm. Healy and Wahlen (1998) explain that if financial 
reports are supposed to communicate private information on firms reported by the 
managers, standards should permit managers to exercise some judgement in        
financial reporting. This helps managers use their knowledge about their respective 
firm and its opportunities to choose the most appropriate reporting methods and 
estimates in order to match with the actual economic condition. However, this can 
lead managers to adopt opportunistic behavior for their personal gains and go down 
the path of earnings management, which is the phenomenon of managers choosing 
inappropriate reporting methods and accounting policies to provide inaccurate   
earnings estimates. For this reason, the SEC has formed an earnings management 
task force to keep a check on the published financial information and ensure its  
quality. (ibid., 2.) 
Barth and his colleagues mention that sometimes, accounting standards can limit 
managers from producing financial information that more clearly represents the 
firm’s respective economic condition (Barth et al. 2007, 472). According to Dechow, 
De, and Schrand (2010, 344), ” Higher quality earnings provide more information 
about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific 
decision made by a specific decision-maker. ” This signifies that the quality of      
earnings is dependent on the context in hand and the impended use of it. Penman 
(27) agrees with the above notion and further states that the quality of current   
earnings is high if it gives an investor a clear idea about the future earnings of the 
firm. The meaning of earnings quality has over time transformed into ”clear and   
unambiguous”. According to Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010, 379), the determinants 
of earnings quality are divided into 6 categories: firm characteristics, auditing    
committee, corporate governance and control, financial reporting practices, equity 
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market incentives, and external factors (such as tax regulations and political          
processes).  
3 Empirical Literature Review 
3.1 Role and relevance of financial information 
According to Elliot and Elliot (2011), ”Accountancy is the art of communicating      
financial information about a business entity to users such as shareholders and  
managers. The communication is generally in the form of financial statements that 
show in money terms the economic resources under the control of the management. 
” They mention that the shareholders (external users of information) of a company 
need information on a regular basis in order to be able to evaluate the efficiency of 
managers and their use of the available resources. This information is also vital in 
making forecasts about a firm’s future earnings and liabilities. Managers, on the  
other hand, require this information to make investment and everyday business   
related decisions. Since managers are in direct control of a firm, they have access to 
more specific information than the shareholders themselves. Due to this, there may 
arise an asymmetry between the information available to managers and the     
shareholders of a firm. The shareholders may, in some cases, want to have more 
specific information regarding the figures presented on the financial statements, but 
do not have the access to get it. Even though the government considers shareholders 
to be the most important users of financial reports, there are restrictions on the 
amount of information the directors of a firm are required to present to the      
shareholders. (30.) Richardson (1998) confirmed this asymmetry in information and 
went further to show the consequences of this in the form of earnings management 
(refer to chapter 2.1.3).   
Bushman and Smith (2001) define the governance role of financial information as the 
use of externally reported financial data in control mechanisms that assist in the  
efficient governance of corporations. According to them, financial information is the 
result of corporate accounting and external-reporting systems that estimate and  
release audited accounting data regarding the performance of publicly listed firms. 
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Financial information from the statements produced by a firm is also used in         
implementing managerial incentive contracts (e.g. bonuses based on annual profit 
figures). Bushman and Smith (2001, 1-63.) and Elliot and Elliot (2011) emphasize the 
use of financial data in identifying investment opportunities by analyzing profit   
margins created by other firms.  
Elliot and Elliot (2011, 138-139) explain the various uses of financial information for 
specific user groups as follows: 
• Investors: to evaluate the operational performance of managers, take     
management related decisions and to take investment related decisions (buy, 
hold or sell shares).  
• Lenders: to identify the risks associated with giving a loan.  
• Suppliers: to make decisions regarding selling to a company or not and to   
ensure the receipt of payments.  
• Employees: to assess the financial condition of the firm and estimate its   
profitability and to assess the ability of the firm to contribute to pension 
plans, retirement plans and take care of other employment related matters.  
• Customers: to assess the future existence and performance of the firm        
because of product/service warranty matters.  
• Government: to regulate the activities of the firm and to produce national 
statistics. 
• Public: to determine the effect of the firm’s activities on the local social and 
environment community.  
According to Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005, 5), the chief financial officers 
think that earnings stated in the financial statements are the key metric used by   
outsiders to assess the performance of a firm. He explains that the two major      
earnings benchmarks are the previous year’s quarterly earnings for the same period, 
and analysts’ consensus estimate. Managers believe that meeting or exceeding the 
benchmark is really important for the firm to build a good reputation and credibility 
in the market and to keep the stock price high. This motivates the managers to     
sacrifice long-term shareholder value for short-time gains. Graham et al. (2005)  
states that the major consequences of not meeting an earnings benchmark are ”an 
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increase in the uncertainty about future prospects” and ”a perception among       
outsiders that there are deep, previously unknown problems at the firm.” (29).  
3.2 Management board and earnings management 
When it comes to financial reporting, the management of a firm has some discretion 
as to what to show in the actual financial statements. Identifying the factors that 
influence the management’s disclosure decisions is a major research problem.      
(Karamanou and Vafeas 2005, 454.) Williams (1996) documented that the forecasting 
reputation of the management is established based on the accuracy of prior earnings 
forecasts, and Tan, Libby, and Hunton (2002) state that the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts is an indicator of the management’s competence. The litigation risk is 
greater when managers are too optimistic about the future earnings, which           
motivates them to be conservative in their forecast. Bamber and Cheon (1998) found 
that because of this reason, managers report bad news relative to analysts’ prior  
expectations. This line of activity provides management with incentives. (Karamanou 
and Vaefer 2005, 461.) According to Healy and Wahlen (1998), the common use of 
accounting information by investors and analysts in valuing stocks can provide      
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings in order to influence the short-term 
stock performance. Also, compensation contracts in some firms are made on the 
basis of financial figures from the annual financial statements, which is another    
motivator for managers to manage earnings in their favor. Another common reason 
for which managers may manipulate earnings is to run from the industry regulations 
such as taxation. (10-23.) 
Earnings management goes beyond just manipulating the company’s published    
financial reports to managing analysts’ earnings forecasts. Firms can cooperate with 
analysts in order to have them publish more preferable forecasts and also reward 
them for doing so. Managers publish more precise earnings forecasts in firms that 
have a greater analyst following. There has been evidence of firm-analyst               
cooperation in the past, for example, for the bank Credit Suisse in 2000, when the 
bank rewarded an analyst by paying extra pay for assisting in the achievement of 
stock and high-yield debt transactions. Michael Jensen argued that stock-based and 
equity incentives encourage managers to increase short-term stock prices so as to 
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benefit from eventually selling the shares they own of their own firms’ stock.      
Penman (1982), Sivakumar and Waymire (1994), and Noe (1999) found that        
managers tend to sell more of their shares after good news (when the firm has  
beaten or met earnings forecast) that after bad news. Jensen and Murphy (2004) 
state that top level management has major benefits of meeting the earning targets; 
according to their research, the stock price rises 5.5% when the analysts’ forecast is 
beaten, decreases by -5.05% when the earnings are in negative, and rises by 1.63% 
when the actual earnings match the forecast. Interestingly, managers do not only 
have incentives for reporting overly optimistic earnings figure, but also for presenting 
low earnings. This is due to the fact that by reporting low earnings in a year with 
good firm performance, more can be saved up and the firm can then increase     
earnings in the future as and when required. (Jensen and Murphy 2004, 90-91.; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005, 1.) 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) found out that managerial ownership assists in avoiding 
information asymmetry and other conflicts between the board of directors and the 
management. This result was supported by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) when 
they found the evidence that the reported earnings portrayed a more realistic      
picture of the firm when insiders had a greater ownership stake in the firm.           
(Karamanou and Vaefer 2005, 457.) However, managerial ownership can pave the 
path for managers to keep a check on the short-term stock prices, which may lead to 
earnings management. Cheng and Warfield (2005) found a significant relationship 
between equity incentives and the firm having beaten or just met the analysts’   
forecasts. Furthermore, they reported that managers with high equity incentives are 
more likely to be involved in earnings management than managers with low equity 
incentives. (2-4.) 
3.3 Corporate governance and earnings management 
A firm’s board of directors is considered to be the primary controller of the quality of 
financial reporting. This is because the board has the responsibility to monitor the 
performance of managers, especially when it comes to financial reporting. M. Lo Bue 
(2006, 135) mentions that the separation of ownership puts the board of directors of 
a firm in a central position of the operations involved in corporate governance. While 
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the management team has direct access to and control over day-to-day decision-
making, physical and non-tangible resources, the shareholders are spread out geo-
graphically with almost negligible access to the vital information of the day-to-day 
operations of the firm and its employees. This information gap is to be bridged by the 
board of directors. According to Karamanou and Vaefer (2005), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), based on empirical evidence, stated that independent directors (directors not 
under the influence of the management) help focus on shareholder value instead of     
managerial opportunism. Furthermore, they say that even those the knowledge base 
of a board is enhanced with more number of directors, larger boards are usually 
more inefficient - the effect that is more dominant. Vaefas (1999) also suggests that 
the number of board meetings is directly related to a firm’s monitoring performance. 
(Karamanou and Vaefer 2005, 456-457.) 
Karamanou and Vaefer (2005) found that the precision of a financial forecast is    
directly linked to the quality of governance, but only when bad news (earnings less 
than expected) is reported. Managers being guided by effective boards and audit 
committees, and active shareholders, have greater pressures to provide information 
of better quality. They explain this by suggesting that better governed firms are more 
conscious about their obligation to not mislead their shareholders, and this danger of 
misleading them is greater when the actual performance of the firm is worse than 
the forecast. In order to avoid this risk, the firm has the tendency to issue more 
vague forecasts. (ibid., 455.) 
Chtorou, Bédard, and Corteau (2001) found that some characteristics of a board of 
directors have a significant effect on the quality of financial reporting. They report 
that there is a direct relationship between the board members’ experience (within & 
outside the firm) and the likelihood of high earnings management.  
When it comes to the size of the board, there have been different results provided by 
various researchers. Jensen (1993) states that the larger the board, the less effective 
it is and the easier it is for the CEO to control. On the other side of the spectrum,  
Dalton, Daily, Johson and Ellstrand (1999) state that a larger board provides more 
expertise to the firm. The relationship between the board size and the quality of  
financial statements is also mixed. Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of       
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financial statement fraud is higher with a larger board, whereas Abbott, Parker, and 
Peters (2000) reported the existence of no relation between the two. (2-11.) 
An independent board of directors plays a vital role in maintaining the effectiveness 
of a firm’s corporate governance. This has been emphasized in agency theory, which 
considers the monitoring and controlling function of the board of directors as the 
most critical one. Independent directors are generally assumed to be better monitors 
tan other directors due to their ability to act in the best interests of the corporation 
itself. Non-executive directors have rewards for maintaining a good reputation as 
decision controlling and monitoring experts. Beasley (1996) found a negative        
relationship between the proportion of non-executive members on the board and 
the probability of fraud. Chtourou and colleagues also found that firms with lowest 
discretionary accruals had a higher percentage of independent non-executive board 
directors. Corporate government reports as well as researchers suggest the          
separation of the roles of chairperson and CEO in order to avoid giving excessive 
power to the CEO. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) demonstrated that firms 
whose CEOs were the chairperson of the board were more prone to being subject to 
law enforcement by the Security & Exchange Commission. (Chtourou et al. 2001, 12-
13.) 
It is commonly believed that a director who owns a big stake in the firm is more likely 
to question and challenge management’s proposals because of his or her decisions 
influence their own wealth. However, Gerety and Lehn (1997) reported that          
accounting fraud has a negative relationship with the stock ownership of the board 
members and Beasley (1996) showed that there is a negative relationship between 
financial reporting fraud and non-executive directors’ ownership stake in the firm. 
These evidence also support Jensen’s argument that when outside directors own a 
substantial stake in the firm, it provides them with rewards for monitoring the      
activity of management more closely. Furthermore, these findings suggest that   
earnings management is negatively related to the ownership of outside directors in 
the firm. (ibid., 13-14.) 
Many studies support the opinion that the competence of non-executive directors is 
extremely important for the effectiveness of the board of directors. Weisbach (1988) 
found that boards consisting mostly of outside directors are more likely to replace 
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poorly performing CEOs. Also, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found that shareholder 
wealth is positively related to the increase in the number of outside directors on a 
board. In order to be a competent monitor of the management’s activities, a director 
should have a good knowledge of the company affairs and the governance process. 
Research also shows that experience is vital in the development for superior       
competency. Chtorou and colleagues showed that the firms with lowest                 
discretionary accruals had non-executive directors who had more years of             
directorship experience. Non-executive board members’ experience on the board of 
the company provides them with monitoring competencies and a better knowledge 
of the company as well as its executives. Beasley (1996) supported this argument 
showing that the likelihood of financial reporting fraud is negatively related to the 
average tenure of non-executive directors. On the other hand, Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) argued that CEOs adopt opportunistic behavior as they approach the end of 
their careers. (ibid.; Booth and Deli 1995, 81.) 
The ”Business Hypothesis” states that firms that have busy board directors represent 
ineffective corporate governance. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that board 
directors who are involved as directors in a large number of firms can become    
overcommitted and this might hamper their monitoring efficiency. While Fich and 
Shivdasai (2006) validated this assertion, some other researchers found no evidence 
of the connection between the number of board directorships a member holds and 
the performance of the firm. Fich and Shivdasani argue that the research conclusions 
of Ferris and his colleagues were based on inefficient metrics; where Fich and 
Shivdasani focused on the average number of board directorships held by outside 
directors of a firm, Ferris and his colleagues focused on the percentage of outside 
directors who were busy. Therefore, the results of the research on busyness          
hypothesis depend on how one defines director busyness. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
showed that the probability of a CEO getting involved in other firms as an outside 
director is positively related to their firm’s performance (Booth and Deli 1995, 82). 
Research in this field has provided evidence that there is a positive correlation      
between the proportion of independent directors who hold three or more board 
positions and the level of executive compensation, which suggests that busy           
directors are less likely to be involved in effective managerial monitoring compared 
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to directors who hold fewer board positions. The reasoning behind this is that in 
firms with weak corporate governance systems, managers are successful in            
influencing their compensation committees. However, Andres and Lehmann (2010) 
argue that merely focusing on the number of board linkages (directorships in other 
firms held by a board member) is not enough, and that the importance of these    
linkages is what makes a difference. They found evidence that firms with board 
members who were central players in large firms displayed weaker corporate       
governance traits that firms with board members who held a large number of       
directorship positions in small firms. (Andres and Lehmann 2010, 1-25.) 
The number of outside directorships a board member holds is an indicator of his or 
her monitoring competence. Chtourou and colleagues’ findings support this      
statement. Multiple directorships allow members to develop their governance   
competencies and results support that additional directorships may be linked to 
monitoring effectiveness. Several evidences exist for the opinion that non-executive 
directors of firms alleged by the SEC are more likely to lose their other directorship 
positions. Chtourou & colleagues state ”several authors suggest that the managerial 
labor market for outside directorships rewards effective outside directors with     
additional positions as directors, but disciplines outside directors who have a record 
of poor monitoring performance.” On the other side of the equation, Pombo and 
Gutierrez (2010) documented the positive influence of busy independent directors 
on a firm’s performance (Chakravarty, Marisetty, and Veeraraghavan 2011, 5). 
(Chtourou et al. 2001, 12-13.) 
The New York Stock Exchange made it a legal requirement for publicly listed firms in 
the US to have an audit committee. An audit committee is a part of the board of  
directors that consists of representatives of a firm’s shareholders who verify the  
information supplied by managers and ensure its quality. The role of an audit    
committee is to examine the financial information that is collected, summarized and 
edited by the management in order to ensure that the information represents the 
real economic condition of the firm. This representation is also referred to as the 
”true and fair view”. The audit committee, hence, also plays a major role in lowering 
the transparency barrier and strengthening the corporate governance. It is required 
for publicly listed firms to have at least one director who has an expertise in financial 
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reporting. This requirement is fulfilled by the audit committee in some firms. The 
companies who pass this test are said to have received a clean audit and are reward-
ed for their quality of earnings by an increase in the stock price or a lower interest 
rate on debt in the financial market. (M. Lo Blue 2006) 
3.4 Measures of earnings management  
Although earnings management has been a concern for a long time, very little      
evidence of the same has been generated by academics, as documented by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999). This is mainly due to the fact that when academics study       
earnings management, they tend to analyze a large number of firms and use        
conventional measures of earnings management, which limit the depth of their    
research and hence produce marginal results. Also, in order to identify earnings 
management, it is not enough to produce conclusive results without analyzing the 
intent of the management. On the other hand, practitioners in the industry have 
been more successful in providing evidence of earnings management by studying 
individual firms and their reports, partly because they have different objectives as to 
what academics have. Dechow and Skinner (2000, 1-2.)  
In order to identify if earnings management has taken place, one has to first estimate 
the earnings before the effect of earnings management took place. One approach to 
estimate this is to identify managers’ incentives to manipulate the reported earnings 
and match them with the patters of unexpected accruals that are consistent with the 
incentives. Unexpected accruals are the unexplained portion of the total accruals. 
(Defond and Subramanyam 1998, 47.) 
Another measure of earnings quality was provided by Jones model (2001), which 
uses a regression model to calculate the non-discretionary component of accruals, 
which is further deducted from the total accruals to calculate the discretionary     
accrual amount (Subramanyam 1996, 250-251). However, according to McNichols 
(2000, 67-68), the amount of discretionary accruals calculated using Jones model 
(1991) does not represent the purest picture, but also includes a range of              
non-discretionary components. He suggests the use to specific accrual accounts   
instead of the aggregate accrual amount in order to assess the quality of earnings.  
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Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) mention earnings persistence, earnings        
smoothness, magnitude of total accruals and discretionary accruals, timely loss 
recognition, benchmark beating, and earnings restatement as examples of earnings 
quality measurement proxies. Their research showed that firms with high accruals 
also had higher discretionary accruals, less persistent earnings, more earnings       
restatements, and poorer internal controls. (345-349.) Barth, Landsman, and Lang 
(2005, 469) considered that firms that had frequent small positive net income had 
managed their earnings.  
3.5 Consequences of earnings management 
According to Bushman and Smith (2001, 64), managers identify potential investment 
opportunities based on the profit margins provided by other firms. If the quality of 
information (in particular, earnings) is not high, managers are prone to making bad 
investment decisions; and in aggregate, this phenomenon acts as a barrier to the 
flow of human and financial capital towards profitable investment in the economy.  
Palmrose and Scholz (2004, 144) state that financial restatements by firms show an 
acknowledgement that the originally published financial statements were not in   
accordance with the accounting standards. The SEC used firm financial restatements 
as justification of earnings management and still describes restatements as the most 
visible indicator of improper accounting. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) found that   
major restatements increased the likelihood and severity of a lawsuit against the 
firm. (144-145.) 
According to Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010, 387), Francis and Krishnan (1999) state 
that firms with high accruals are more prone to getting a modified auditor opinion. 
However, the evidence to support this is not entirely conclusive. Bradshaw,         
Richardson, and Sloan (2001, 72) showed that auditors did not signal the likelihood 
of potential accounting standard violations through their opinion. This is mainly due 
to the fact that even though auditors are aware of the abnormally high accruals and 
their consequence, they are not required to communicate it to the investors.  
Dechow and colleagues found that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts on a 
regular basis receive a higher market valuation. (391.) 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter of the thesis explains the research methods used in the process of     
collecting and analyzing the data used by the author in order to answer the            
pre-determined research questions and the research approach undertaken during 
the implementation of this paper. According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009, 
595), ”methodology” is a theory of how a research should be implemented. It also 
incorporates the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon which the research 
is based. To recap, the objective of this thesis was to assess the quality of financial 
reporting in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, taking 62 publicly listed companies as 
subjects. The underlying metric used to assess the quality of financial reporting was 
discretionary accruals of the respective firm – lower discretionary accruals indicating 
higher quality of reporting and vice-versa. The main hypothesis tested in this thesis 
was whether certain characteristics of a board of directors have an influence on the 
quality of financial reporting (discretionary accruals) published by the firm.  
4.1 Research approach 
Saunders et al. (2009) use the famous ”research onion” in order to illustrate the   
various steps involved in the research process. The research onion, which is divided 
into various layers, depicts various methods and techniques that a researcher can 
employ in  order to collect and analyze data. The first layer of the research onion 
represents research philosophy, which dictates the way the researcher views the 
world and develops knowledge in the respective field. Research philosophy reveals 
the assumptions one when viewing the world and it also guides the strategy and 
methods one uses during the implementation of the research. Accordingly, the     
philosophy of positivism was followed during this specific research since it             
corresponds to the research objective at hand. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) 
explain that when a researcher adopts the positivism philosophy, they take the 
stance like of a natural scientist, wherein they analyze the observable social reality 
and make generalizations that could be replicated in exact circumstances at any   
given time. This requires the use of highly structured data and analysis. (ibid., 598.) 
Furthermore, the author worked independent and external of any influence on the 
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data collected for the analysis and the results of the analysis, which is an assumption 
underlying the positivism philosophy.  
In order to maintain the consistency throughout the research process, it is important 
to establish the nature of the study. The three kinds of research are quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed-method research. Although they involve the use of distinct 
data collection and analyses methods, they should be thought of as complementary, 
instead of distinct strategies. (ibid., 151.) According to Creswell (2013, 32), a       
quantitative research tests objective theories by examining the relationship among 
various variables, which can be calculated to produce numbered data that are        
subsequently analyzed using statistical tools. Qualitative research, on the other hand, 
”is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem.” A research may also involve the use of both –          
quantitative as well as qualitative methods to answer the proposed questions. This 
type of research is known as a mixed-method research. Saunders et al. (2009, 109) 
states that the use of qualitative and quantitative research methods within one    
research may be highly appropriate. However, this research was a quantitative     
research, since the variables involved in answering the research questions were       
expressed in numerical form and analyzed using statistical procedures.  
Saunders et al. (2009, 139) classifies research purposes into three types -               
explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive. The purpose of the research is linked to 
the pre-determined research questions; however, the research purpose can evolve 
over the course of the research. An explanatory research determines the relationship 
between different variables, whereas an exploratory research looks into the details 
of a particular problem and evaluating it with a different perspective. A descriptive 
research is undertaken for the purpose of portraying the accurate profile of a person, 
situation, or an event. This particular research took the path of an explanatory      
research due to the particular objective of this study. (ibid., 139-140.) Creswell (2013, 
282) recommends the use of explanatory approach when the research is begins with 
and is driven by quantitative methods.   
Creswell (2013, 295) defines research approaches as plans and processes that involve 
decisions regarding the philosophical assumptions underlying the research, research 
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design, and the data collection & analysis methods. There are two main research 
approaches – deductive approach and inductive approach. According to Saunders et 
al. (2009, 124), a deductive approach involves developing hypotheses or theories and 
then designing a research strategy to put them to test. An inductive approach,    
however, involves the collection of data and the development of a theory as a result 
of data analysis. Throughout this research, a deductive approach was applied. The 
deduction approach emphasizes the independence of the research from what is   
being analyzed and its outcomes, which matches with the philosophy of positivism in 
this aspect.  
4.2 Data collection  
This research was a cross-sectional research, meaning that the data collected and 
analyzed to answer the proposed questions belonged to a single year – 2015.    
Saunders et al. (2009, 155) defines a cross-sectional research as the study for a    
specific phenomenon (or phenomena) at a specific time. All data that were collected 
to conduct this research was secondary in nature. Secondary data is data that has 
already been collected for other purposes by an entity (ibid., 256). 
The theoretical part of the literature review was collected using various books,     
research articles, and reports and papers published by professional organizations. 
This data were useful in order to explain the major concepts and theories related to 
financial reporting and earnings quality involved in this research to the reader.     
Extensive empirical research was done and presented in the empirical literature   
review in order to give a background on the existing research on the quality of      
financial reporting and the factors affecting it. The data were collected from research 
articles and regulatory reports. These articles and reports were found in Internet 
databases. Only articles that were relevant, relatively new, and cited a fairly large 
number of times were chosen. Furthermore, there was another type of data         
collected for answering the research questions – compiled data. Kervin (2009)      
describes this data as information that has been processed or undergone some    
selection and summarization process. In context of this research, this data refers to 
the data collected from the annual reports (and the audited financial statements) of 
companies. (Appendices 9, 10, 11, 12.) The companies were chosen from the major 
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indices of Finland (OMX Helsinki 25), Denmark (OMX Copenhagen 20), and Sweden 
(OMX Stockholm 30 index), which include the major publicly listed companies in the 
respective companies. The data can be found in the appendix section (appendix 9 
and appendix 10) of this paper. All the data were recorded in numerical form so as to 
facilitate subsequent statistical analysis. The data were considered reliable since it 
was collected from trusted sources such as the company’s website and since all the 
companies were publicly listed, the financial statements were produced in             
accordance to the International Financial Reporting Standards. The variables that 
were   collected from the annual reports were as follows:  
• Log of board size: Board size refers to the total number of members in a 
company’s board of directors. This was recorded in the form of natural       
logarithm, which is important to avoid the linearity and hence the              
predictability of the outcomes.  
• Median age of board executives: First, the age of each of the board members 
was collected and then the median of the data was calculated.  
• Education background: This refers to the academic received by the board 
members. A numeric “1” was assigned to a board member with a relevant 
bachelor’s degree, “2” to a master’s degree, and a “3” to a PhD.  
• Firm specific experience: This refers to the number of years a board member 
has served as a board member on the same company.  
• Number of other linkages: This refers to the number of other directorships a 
board member holds in companies other than the one included in the          
research.  
• Total assets (described in chapter 2.1.2) 
• Total liabilities (described in chapter 2.1.2) 
• Cash (described in chapter 2.1.2) 
• Gross property, plant, and equipment (described in chapter 2.1.2) 
• Cash dividends: A cash dividend is a financial contribution made by a       
company to its shareholders usually from its current earnings or retained 
earnings.  
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• Net issuance: Net issuance refers to the difference between the amount of 
new equity issued by the company and the equity redemptions made by the 
company.  
• Profit after tax: This refers to the net amount of profits earned by a company 
after deducting all the expenses occurred before, during, and after sales and 
the taxes paid.  
• Log of CEO total remuneration (LN CEO Rem): This refers to the natural    
logarithm of the total remuneration paid to the CEO of a firm in 2015. It       
includes the base salary as well as the performance-based incentives.  
• CEO fixed pay: This variable represents only the fixed base salary of the CEO 
in 2015.  
• CEO performance-based pay: This refers to the incentive portion of the CEO 
total remuneration in 2015.  
• Median fixed pay executive board: The variable shows the median of the   
total remuneration paid to an executive team member of the firm in 2015.  
• Median performance-based pay executive board: The median of the           
incentives paid to an executive team member of a firm in 2015 is shown using 
this variable. 
• Median fixed pay non-executive board: This variable shows the median of 
the fixed salary paid to a non-executive member (board director) of a firm in 
2015.  
• Median performance-based pay non-executive board: The variable refers to 
the median of the incentives paid to a board member of a firm in 2015.  
The data concerning the above-mentioned variables can be found in appendix 8 
(Variables of corporate governance) and appendix 11 (Remuneration of executive 
and non-executive team). Also, an abbreviation table is included in appendix 13. 
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4.3 Data analysis 
Data that involves numbers or that can be presented in a numerical form is known as 
quantitative data. Quantitative data, in its raw form i.e. before it has been processed 
or analyzed, does not provide much value to most readers. In order to translate this 
data into meaningful information, it has to be processed using graphs, diagrams, or 
statistical tools. (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill 2009, 414.)  
In this research, the analysis was twofold – 1) calculation of discretionary accruals; 
2) Inferential analysis . Before any analysis was conducted, all the variables required 
for each analysis were collected and organized using Microsoft Excel. A variable is 
anything that changes due to certain circumstances. The three stages of analysis are 
explained below.  
1. Calculation of discretionary accruals  
In this part of the analysis, the raw data were collected from the annual statements 
of the 62 publicly listed firms from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. This data were 
collected in Microsoft Excel program. The variables that were used in their absolute 
raw form were financial figures needed to calculate the discretionary accruals of the 
firms in the year 2015. Various formulae needed to be used in order to calculate the 
variables involved in the accrual estimation process using Jones model (described in 
chapter 2.1.2). Firstly, Total net accruals are calculated using two methods:  
Balance sheet method: Total net accruals = Change in assets – Change in liabilities – 
Change in cash 
Cash flow method: Total net accruals = Profit after tax – cash earnings  
Jones model requires the use of the following equation to calculate the discretionary 
accruals:  
TAit/Ait-1 = β0 (1/Ait-1) + β1 (ΔREVit/Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1)+ ԑit 
After the required variables (explained in chapter 2.1.2) were calculated, a regression 
was run using the SPSS software (a statistical tool) with the above equation to      
estimate the beta coefficients. According to Field (2009, 7), most hypotheses can be 
explained using two variables – a proposed cause (independent variable) and a    
proposed outcome (dependent variable). In this regression, TAit/Ait-1 was taken as 
the dependent variable, and 1/Ait-1, ΔREVit/Ait-1, and PPEit/Ait-1 were taken as the 
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independent variables. After the estimated values for the beta coefficients had been 
calculated, they were put into the following formula to calculate the non-
discretionary accruals:  
NDA (Non-discretionary accruals) / Ait-1 = β0(1/Ait-1) + β1(ΔREV) + β2(PPE / Ait-1 ) 
To calculate discretionary accruals (amount shown in appendix 12), non-discretionary 
accruals were deducted from the previously estimated Total net accruals. The       
discretionary accrual amounts were also subsequently organized in the excel sheet 
containing other variables.  
2. Inferential analysis 
Creswell (2013, 197) describes inferential analysis as analysis that related variables in 
order to derive inferences from the sample to a population. Regression analysis was 
performed taking the discretionary accrual amounts of the chosen firms as            
dependent variable. The independent variables in this research included the          
following:  
• Natural log of board size 
• Median age of board directors  
• Educational background of board directors 
• Firm-specific experience of board directors  
• Number of other directorships held by the board directors 
• Remuneration structure of executive team members 
• Remuneration structure of board members 
 
In this research, a bivariate correlational analysis was also performed using the SPSS 
software in order to determine the relationships among the variables. This was done 
by importing the collected data regarding the variables from excel into the SPSS   
program and selecting ”Bivariate analysis” as the analysis type. (ibid., 175.) The    
outcome of the correlational analysis provides data regarding the Pearson’s          
correlation coefficient and the significance of the relationships between the          
independent variables and the dependent variable. The value of this coefficient 
ranges from -1 to 1, wherein a positive number indicates a relationship that involves 
the changes in both the variables in the same direction, and a negative number    
indicates a relationship that involves a change in one variable leading to an opposite 
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change in the other variable; the closer the coefficient to 1 (in positive correlation) or 
-1 (in negative correlation), the stronger the relationship, and the closer the          
coefficient to 0, the weaker the relationship. The outcome of the analysis also       
displays the R2 value, which measures the proportion of variation in the dependent 
variable due to the changes in independent variables, and ranges from 0 to 1 -  
greater value indicating greater proportion of covariance (Saunders et al. 2009, 461). 
(228.) In addition of these outputs, the significance of the relationships is also       
provided in the data table by SPSS. A ”sig.” value shows the probability that the    
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable has    
occurred by chance. (ibid., 463.) 
Apart from analyzing the correlations, there were other techniques used to process 
the data in order to get meaningful information. While performing the bivariate 
analysis, the SPSS software gives the option to choose ”descriptive statistics” and 
”Durbin-Watson”, which were chosen for this research. Descriptive statistics refers to 
the means and standard deviations of the variables involved in the analysis. These 
data were displayed in the form of a table. Durbin-Watson, on the other hand, shows 
the estimate of independent errors of the researcher. If the estimate of the          
Durbin-Watson test deviates significantly from 2, it indicates low reliability of the 
analysis results.  
The analysis performed in this research using the SPSS software provides various 
outputs, such as, the model summary, regression coefficients, correlation              
coefficients, means and standard deviations, R2 (R-square), significance,                
Durbin-Watson, and the t-value. However, only a few of the outputs will be critically 
analyzed in detail for this particular study.  
4.4 Reliability and validity 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009, 156) define reliability as the extent to which a 
researcher’s data collection methods or analysis techniques will produce consistent 
results for a similar data set. This can be evaluated by considering the whether    
similar measures will lead to similar results, whether similar observations will be 
made by other observers, and whether there is transparency in how raw data were 
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used in the research. The reliability of a research can be hampered by four different 
types of threats – subject threat (errors in conducting research, wrong timing for 
data collection, inaccurate data sources, etc.), subject bias (e.g. inaccurate             
information given by interviewees), observer error (e.g. errors in approaching a    
research question), and observer bias (e.g. errors in interpreting the collected or  
analyzed data). Concerning this particular research, the findings are reliable due to 
the fact that the methods chosen to approach the research objective at hand have 
been used by a number of significant researchers in a similar way. Another point to 
be noted is that the variables involved in this research were used in a way that the 
analyses technique can be replicated for other samples and will produce similar re-
sults. The data used in the analysis were collected from reliable sources, such as the 
official websites of the chosen companies. Some data had to be scaled by a common   
measure in order to account for size effect and other phenomenon that might have 
hampered the findings otherwise. Furthermore, the data collection methods and the 
analysis technique used in this research were explained in fair detail in order to make 
it easily understandable for any reader, regardless of his/her background.  
Validity refers to the accuracy of the findings and whether the findings represent 
what they were intended to. Saunders and colleagues classify validity into two major 
types – external validity and internal validity. External validity is majorly concerned 
about the degree to which the findings of the research can be generalized to a bigger 
population. To maintain external validity in this research, an efficient sampling     
approach was applied when choosing the companies used in the analysis. A total of 
62 companies were chosen from the biggest national indices of Finland, Sweden, and 
Denmark. These companies represent a major population and are from a variety of 
different industries, which avoided the generalization of the results to be limited to a 
certain type of companies. Internal validity, on the other hand, can be further divided 
into two kinds – content validity and construct validity. Content validity is concerned 
about the match between the initial research objectives and the outcomes. It       
ensures that the results represent what they were intended to, in the first place. 
Threats to construct validity occur when researchers use inefficient measures of the 
variables involved in the research. In order to ensure the internal validity of the    
research results, the regression analysis was performed using variables that          
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controlled for other factors that might influence the results. Furthermore, the data 
collected from the published reports and audited financial statements of the chosen 
companies should be considered valued owing to the fact that the rules and policies 
related to corporate governance are similar in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and 
these can be found in appendix 7. Also, the factors of corporate governance that 
were hypothesized to influence the amount of discretionary accruals of the firms 
produced findings that were in line with the types of results expected. Hence, the 
results of this thesis should be considered valid.  
5 Results 
This chapter states the outcomes of the analysis performed to assess the quality of 
financial reporting in Nordic countries, taking 62 publicly listed companies from    
Finland, Denmark, and Norway as case studies. The results are divided into two    
sections – descriptive statistics and correlations.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The variables analyzed to produce descriptive statistics (Appendix 1) for the research 
were: Discretionary accruals calculated using Balance Sheet method (DABalSheet), 
Discretionary accruals calculated to Cash Flow method (DACashFlow), Natural Log of 
board size (BoardSizeLN), Median age of board of directors (BODAge), Educational 
background of board directors (Education), Firm-specific experience of board        
directors (Experience), Number of other directorships/linkages (DirectorLinks),    
Natural Log of the total remuneration of the CEO (CEORemunLN), Ratio of              
performance pay to fixed pay of the CEO (CEOPerfFix), Ratio of the median            
performance pay to median fixed pay of executive team members (ExecPerFix), Ratio 
of the median performance pay to median fixed pay of board directors (NedPerFix), 
Natural Log of total assets of the firm (AssetsLN).  
The mean of the log of board size was 2,172 with a standard deviation of 0,282. The 
board size i.e. the number of board members in a firm, was taken as a natural log of 
the actual number of the board members in order to account for the size effect. The 
mean of the median age of the board members in companies was found out to be 
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57,7 years, the standard deviation measuring 3,34 years. The mean of the median 
number of years of higher education received by the board members of the        
companies was 1,75 years with individual values barely deviating from the mean. The 
mean number of years a board member had been on the board of the same        
company was 4,3 years, and the standard deviation was estimated to be approx. 2,7 
years. The mean number of outside board memberships a board member held was 3 
and the individual values deviated approx. 1 point.  
The mean of the log median total remuneration of the CEOs was 14,4 with the 
standard deviation being approx. 0,7, whereas the mean for the ratio of performance 
pay to fixed pay was 1,135 with the standard deviation of approx. 1,2. The mean of 
the log ratio of performance pay to fixed pay of an executive was 0,887, whereas for 
a non-executive director, it was 0,477. The mean of the log of total assets owned by 
a firm was 8,94 and the standard deviation for the same was 1,60.  
The standard deviation of the discretionary accrual (Balance Sheet method) amounts 
was relatively large. This shows that the discretionary accruals of firms were          
significant different from one another even after appropriate standardization and 
scaling of variables involved in the calculation. However, this can also be due to the 
fact that the companies involved in the analysis belonged to several industries and 
different industries require different accounting measures.  
On the other hand, the standard deviation calculated using the total net accruals 
estimated by the cash flow method was 0,107, which was lesser than the standard 
deviation calculated using the balance sheet method. However, it is worth noting 
that the mean of discretionary accruals calculated in this case was in negative, as 
opposed to the discretionary amount calculated using the balance sheet method.  
5.2 Inferential analysis results 
The correlational analysis resulted in a matrix of correlational coefficients for the 
relationships between all the variables involved in the research. The regression   
analysis, on the other hand, examined the causal relationship between the            
independent variables and the dependent variable. For this research, the regression 
was done twice – first with discretionary accruals calculated using balance sheet 
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method as the dependent variable, and second with discretionary accruals calculated 
using cash flow method. For both the cases, the results of the regression analysis 
done using SPSS provided information in the form of a model summary displaying the 
Pearson correlation coefficient, R2 and the adjusted R2, and a matrix showing the 
standardized regression coefficients, unstandardized regression (b) coefficients and 
their significance. Standardized coefficient shows the strength of the effect that a 
change in an independent variable causes in the dependent variable, whereas the 
unstandardized regression coefficient indicates the average change in the dependent 
variable when a change of 1 unit occurs in a particular independent variable.         
Unstandardized regression coefficients were the main focus on this particular       
research.   
Correlational analysis 
The results of the correlational analysis (appendix 6) indicated a highly significant 
positive correlation (r=,367**) between the discretionary accruals (balance sheet 
method) of a firm and the number of years a current board member of the firm has 
served on the board. The correlation between the discretionary accruals calculated 
taking the total net accruals from the cash flow method and the experience of a 
board member in the firm was also found to be significant (r=,299*), supporting the 
finding that the more experience a board member has in the firm, the lower is the 
quality of financial reporting of the firm. The ratio of the performance pay to the 
fixed pay of an executive team member also showed a highly significant positive  
correlation (r=,590**) with the discretionary accruals (balance sheet method) of the 
firm.  
Other factors that showed a significant correlation with discretionary accruals were 
the number of other directorship positions held by a board member in other firms, 
the logarithm of the total remuneration of the CEO, and the ratio of performance pay 
to fixed pay of the CEO. This precise strength of the correlations and their              
significance can be seen from the correlation matrix presented in appendix 6.  
Regression analysis - Balance sheet method of accruals 
The model summary of the analysis provided 2 different models and the respective 
correlation coefficients and the beta coefficients. In order to answer the research 
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questions of this study, model 2 (Appendix 2) was considered more appropriate to be 
examined. According to this model, there was a strong positive relationship between 
the independent variables ExecPerFix and Experience, and the dependent variable 
DABalSheet, owing to the 0,667 R (correlation coefficient) value. The value of R can 
range from -1 to +1 - +1 indicating a perfect positive relationship, 0 no relationship, 
and -1 a perfect negative relationship. Furthermore, the adjusted R square value of 
this coefficient was 0,426, meaning that 42,6% of the variation in the dependent  
variable i.e. the discretionary accruals of the listed firms, is a result of the change in 
the independent variables – ratio of the performance pay to fixed pay of the         
executive team members, and the firm-specific experience of the board members. It 
should be noted that the Durbin-Watson for this analysis was estimated as 2,076, 
which makes the results of this research valid.  
Examining the unstandardized beta coefficient matrix (Appendix 3), it is visible that 
there is a causal relationship between the above-mentioned independent variables 
and the dependent variable. This is so due to the positive values indicated by the 
beta coefficients. This result is significant due to the 0,000 sig. Value for the           
independent variable ExecPerFix and the 0,002 sig. Value for the independent       
variable Experience. Saunders et al. (2009), the statistics result is highly significant if 
the sig. Value is 0.01. In other words, for this research, we can conclude that one can 
say with approx. 100% confidence that there is a causal relationship between the 
two independent variables and the dependent variable (when calculated using the 
balance sheet method). It is also noteworthy that there was found to be a negative 
causal relationship (b=0,15) between the education background of a board member 
and the discretionary accrual amount of the firm (Appendix 3). 
Regression analysis - Cash flow method of accruals 
The results of the regression analysis performed using the total net accruals          
calculated using cash flow method also provided 2 models, each representing       
different values for relationship indicators. As in the balance sheet method, model 2 
(Appendix 4) was chosen to be more appropriate for this analysis as well. According 
to this model, the relationship between the independent variables ExecPerFix and 
Experience, and the dependent variable (DACashFlow) was positively strong with a 
correlation coefficient (R) value of 0,391. The adjusted R square value for this        
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coefficient was 0,124, indicating that 12,4% of the variation in the discretionary    
accruals (calculated using cash flow method) can be explained by the variation in the 
two independent variables. The Durbin-Watson for this coefficient was 2,079, which 
shows that the results are valid.  
The regression coefficient matrix (Appendix 5) provided a set of different values for 
the unstandardized regression coefficients. The beta value for ExecPerFix was -0,27, 
which represents a negative causal relationship between the ratio of performance to 
fixed pay of the executive team members, and the discretionary accruals of the  
company. The sig. Value for this coefficient was 0,039, which makes this value      
significant. On the other hand, the beta value for the variable Experience was found 
out to be 0,013, indicating a positive causal relationship between the firm-specific 
experience of a board member and the discretionary accruals of the company. This 
was accompanied by a sig. Value of 0,009, making this result highly significant. Apart 
from the above two significant independent variables, the variable DirectorLinks 
showed a positive causal relationship (b=0,23) with the discretionary accrual amount, 
showing that higher the number of outside directorships held by a board member, 
higher the amount of discretionary accruals of the firm (Appendix 5). 
6 Discussion 
This chapter aims to explain the results of the analysis performed in order to answer 
the research questions and compare the results of this study to existing literature on 
the issue at hand i.e. the quality of financial reporting. The chapter also explains the 
practical implications of this research along with its limitations. At the end of the 
chapter, some recommendations have been provided for future research in the area.  
6.1 Summary of the key findings 
The main objective of this research was to determine the characteristics of corporate 
governance that have the strongest influence on the quality of financial reporting of 
the firm. This was done by relating the discretionary accruals of the firm to the   
components of corporate governance such as the size of the board, the age of board 
members, the experience of board members on the respective firms, the number of 
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outside directorships held by the board members, and the remuneration of the 
board members and the executive team members. It is important to note that an 
assumption of this research is that a high discretionary accrual amount represents 
the possibility of earnings management being committed.  
To answer our research question stated as ” How is the quality of accounting       
information measured?”, research by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) proposed 
that the determinants of earnings quality include firm characteristics, auditing   
committee, corporate governance and control, financial reporting practices, equity 
market incentives, and external factors (such as tax regulations and political          
processes). Furthermore previous research has provided various means of measuring 
the incidence of earnings management in a firm. Dechow and colleagues showed 
that earnings persistence, earnings smoothness, magnitude of total accruals and  
discretionary accruals, timely loss recognition, benchmark beating, and earnings  
restatement are examples of earnings quality measurement proxies. Their research 
showed that firms with high accruals also had higher discretionary accruals, less   
persistent earnings, more earnings restatements, and poorer internal controls.   
(345-349.) Therefore, analyzing the results of this study and comparing them with 
the existing literature on the subject, it can be proposed that characteristics of     
corporate governance and control, equity incentives, and discretionary accruals are 
one of the most accurate means of detecting earnings management in a firm.  
The regression analysis presented significant results regarding the causal                
relationships between specific independent variables and the dependent variable. 
There was found to be a strong causal relationship between the independent        
variables ratio of performance pay to fixed pay of executive team members and the 
firm-specific experience of the board members, and the dependent variable          
discretional accruals.  
The results indicate that the higher the performance pay of the executive members 
compared to their fixed pay, the higher the discretionary accrual amount of the firm. 
This subsequently increases the probability that earnings have been manipulated. 
According to Cheng and Warfied (2005), discretionary accruals can be used to     
overstate the earnings in order to beat or meet an earnings forecast, for which   
mangers have high equity incentives. This matches with our finding that the          
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performance pay of managers is higher when the discretionary accruals are higher. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006, 528) reported that companies with CEOs who have 
high equity incentives often face earnings management. The motivation for           
executives to manipulate the earnings is higher when the incentives for beating or 
meeting an earnings forecast are high, since it leads to personal gains. There has 
been documented evidence that managers often trade long-term losses with     
short-term personal gains. However, Lacker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) found no 
relation   between equity incentives of executive team members of companies and 
earnings management in the company. This shows that there still exist gaps in this 
research area.  
Another variable that was found to have a strong influence on the amount of        
discretionary accruals of a firm was the firm-specific experience of the board     
members i.e. the number of years a board member has been on the board of the 
particular firm. This is consistent with the research performed by Chtorou, Bédard, 
and Corteau (2001), which showed that there exists a direct relationship between 
the experience of a board member on the respective board and the likelihood of 
earnings management. This could owe to the fact that the more a board member 
knows about the firm’s operations and the accounting procedures, the easier it is for 
them to find loop-holes in the accounting policies and hence allow them to misuse 
the discretion they have while preparing the financial statements. This subsequently 
lowers the quality of financial reporting done by a firm.  
Apart from the ratio of performance pay to fixed pay of executive members and the 
firm-specific experience of board members, there were two more factors of          
corporate governance that were found to be related to the amount of discretionary 
accruals a firm has. One of these was the education background of the board    
members. As mentioned in the previous section, education background of the board 
members showed a negative relationship with discretionary accruals, meaning that 
the more educated a board members, the lower the discretionary accruals of the 
firm and hence better quality of financial reporting. Since it has been shown that 
managers and board members may sacrifice long-term benefits of producing        
accounting information of high quality for short-term financial gains, it is possible 
that they are not fully aware of these benefits and the consequences of                  
42 
 
 
misreporting. If a board member has relevant education in the field and has a grasp 
on the field of finance, they will keep more caution on the financial information    
being reported to the stakeholders. Chiang and He (2010, 12) find a similar relation 
between the education board members have received and the transparency of the 
firm concerning its financial statements.  
The second characteristic that was found to be related to discretionary accrual 
amount of a firm is the number of outside directorships held by the board members. 
The analysis displayed a positive relation between the two variables, meaning that if 
the board members have less number of board positions in other firms, the           
discretionary accrual amount of the firm is lower. This result can be studied under 
the busyness hypothesis explained in the “Theoretical Background” section of this 
study.  Similar result has also been shown by previous research. For example, Fich 
and Shivdasai (2006) validated this proposition when they found a negative           
relationship between the busyness of board directors and their monitoring            
efficiency. However, Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003, 1109) found no      
relationship between the two variables. Research indicates that the results of the 
busyness hypothesis analysis depend on the approach researchers have taken in  
order to define ”busyness”.  
While Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of financial statement fraud is higher 
with a larger board, Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2000) reported the existence of no 
relation between the two. (2-11.) The results of this research were consistent with 
the latter, since there was found to be no significant relationship between the   
number of board directors a firm has and its discretionary accrual amount.  
Gerety and Lehn (1997) reported that accounting fraud has a negative relationship 
with the stock ownership (and hence the performance pay) of the board members. 
However, the results of this research showed no such relationship between the two.  
Hence, to answer the first research question of this particular study i.e. ” Which   
factors of corporate governance and the characteristics of board of directors      
influence the quality of accounting information provided by the firm to its      
stakeholders? ”, the results of the research showed that the ratio of performance 
pay to fixed pay of the executive team members and the firm-specific experience of 
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the board members have a strong negative causal relationship with the quality of 
accounting information published by the firm. There was also found to be a negative 
causal relationship   between the number of other directorships held by a board 
member and the     probability of the firm being involved in earnings management.              
Furthermore, a positive causal relationship was indicated by the research between 
the education background of the board members and the quality of financial report-
ing of the firm. Hence, looking at the results of the research, the hypothesis made in 
the beginning of this paper that certain factors of corporate governance influence 
the amount of discretionary accruals of a firm, can be accepted.  
Answering the third and last research question i.e. ”What are the imperatives of 
enhancing the quality of accounting information?”, the secondary literature        
research and the analysis performed for this study provided various imperatives (or 
factors that influence) of enhancing the quality of information provided by firms to 
their stakeholders. The most important factor to look at when examining the quality 
of financial information is the use of accruals in the financial statements. In           
particular, it is necessary to determine how the discretion is used while reporting the 
figures provided in the statements. Research has shown that discretion allowed to 
managers while making financial statements can be used efficiently or for misstating 
the numbers in order to make short-term gains. Other factors that are vital in       
enhancing the quality of published financial information are related to the qualities 
of board members of a firm and the remuneration structure of executives. According 
to the results of this research, board members who have more experience of working 
at the firm as directors are more efficient at producing transparent information for 
the stakeholders. Also, firms should be careful when appointing board members with 
a lot of other board positions, since it can take more of their time from carefully 
monitoring the efficiency of the top management team of the firm.  Furthermore, 
when appointing a board director, the education background of the person must be 
taken into account. Another way to enhance the transparency of the firm is to      
continually educate the board members on how to govern a company successfully. 
The last imperative, according to this study, of enhance the quality of accounting 
information supplied by a firm is to maintain a healthy ratio of performance pay to 
the fixed pay of executive team members. Results show that a higher performance to 
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fixed pay ratio may motivate employees to engage in the unethical act of               
manipulating earnings in order to make personal gains. Hence, top management 
should be rewarded in more fruitful ways than a high proportion of performance 
related remuneration.  
6.2 Practical implications 
Quality of financial reporting and earnings management, in general, has been one of 
the major research topics in the last few decades. There have been mixed results on 
the evidence of factors that influence the quality of financial reporting of a company. 
This particular research contributed to the extensive literature that already exists on 
the subject, however, the results are particularly important concerning the Nordic 
countries, namely – Finland, Denmark, and Sweden.  
The results of this research could be of interest to regulatory organizations, such as 
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), due to the fact that the SEC formulates 
various policies related to financial disclosures made by publicly listed firms. The  
objective of the SEC is to protect investors and maintain fairness in the financial  
markets. The SEC has the authority to judge the quality of financial information   
supplied by publicly listed firms and hence, by providing significant findings on what 
influences the quality of financial reporting, this research provides the SEC with    
relevant and useful data.  
This research provides findings that may be useful to the auditors in Finland, Sweden, 
and Denmark. Since there are significant relationships found between various factors 
of corporate governance and characteristics of board of directors, the auditors can 
evaluate the financial information provided by the firms more thoroughly.  
Furthermore, these results of this thesis are particularly useful for corporations. The 
findings provide concrete factors to consider when the quality of financial reporting 
is in question. Firms can make decisions regarding the choice of board directors and 
the compensation paid to the executive team members based on the results of this 
research and previous research on the topic.  
Lastly, the findings of this research may be of interest to researchers in the field of 
finance and business in general. Since the findings on the issues presented in this 
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research vary depending on the researcher and the firm sample, any additional    
research findings are of importance to reach more accurate predictions on the     
influencers of quality of financial reporting.  
6.3 Limitations of the research 
There are various limitations of this research, mainly due to the lack of time, money, 
and other resources. Firstly, the power of Jones model, which uses discretionary  
accrual amount as a proxy to detect the quality of financial reporting and earnings 
management has been a topic of research in itself. Jones model makes the             
assumption that there has been no manipulation in the revenue reporting, which can 
be potentially argued against. Secondly, according to Dechow et al. (2010, 358), the 
explanatory power of the model is very low, explaining only about 10% of variation in 
the total accrual amount of a firm, which could be due to the fact that managers 
have high amount of flexibility and discretion in the accrual estimation process, 
which they can misuse to mask the actual performance of the firm itself.  
Secondly, the sample taken for this research represents a very small proportion of 
the actual total population, and may not be big enough to show completely accurate 
results, which can be generalized.  
Thirdly, the data gathered for the analysis required researcher’s discretion during the 
data analysis process. Hence, some assumptions had to be made at the initial stages 
of the research that may or may not have affected the findings.  
However, regardless of the above mentioned limitations, the research provided   
statistically significant results that can be tested for a similar sample and verified  
using other methods, keeping the basic assumptions constant.  
6.4 Recommendations for future research 
The limitations of the research lay the path for an improved research on the subject. 
Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the Jones model for calculating discretionary accruals           
incorporates a few assumptions that can be argued against. This can be improved 
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upon by using the modified Jones model instead, which corrects the assumptions 
made in the Jones model.  
Secondly, this research used inferential analysis as the main technique in order to 
answer the pre-determined research questions. The use of other techniques could 
enhance the understanding of the subject at hand. Thirdly, the usefulness of future 
research on the topic could be increased by including how the manipulation of     
financial information can be prevented. Furthermore, a similar research could be 
done on companies of a smaller scale. These factors could improve upon the         
understanding of the topic.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
DABalSheet ,000000394 ,2091153359 62 
DACashFlow -,000000664 ,1071025693 62 
BoardSizeLN 2,172882869 ,2824741316 62 
BODAge 57,701612903 3,3491614774 62 
Education 1,758064516 ,4853757669 62 
Experience 4,322580645 2,6797613886 62 
DirectorLinks 3,241935484 1,2827414785 62 
CEORemunLN 14,381860837 ,6991764181 62 
CEOPerfFix 1,135011164 1,1910724003 62 
ExecPerFix ,887836837 ,9989072496 62 
NedPerFix ,477265174 1,7843682092 62 
AssetsLN 8,944138371 1,6059129611 62 
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Appendix 2. Model summary (Balance sheet method) 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
2 ,667b ,445 ,426 ,1583989462 2,076 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ExecPerFix 
b. Predictors: (Constant), ExecPerFix, Experience 
 c. Dependent Variable: DABalSheet 
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Appendix 3. Regression coefficients (Balance sheet method) 
Model 2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statis-
tics 
B 
Std. 
Error Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) -,210 ,041 -5,090 ,000   
ExecPerFix ,117*** ,020 5,743 ,000 ,991 1,009 
Experience 
Education  
,024*** 
-,149 ᵠ 
 
,008 
 
 
3,218 
-1,495 
 
,002 
,100 
 
,991 
,929 
 
1,009 
1,076 
 
           ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
           **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
           *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
           ᵠ. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4. Model summary (Cash flow method) 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
2 ,391b ,153 ,124 ,1002148840 2,079 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Experience, ExecPerFix 
c. Dependent Variable: DACashFlow 
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Appendix 5. Regression coefficients (Cash flow method) 
Model 2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -,032 ,026 -1,218 ,228   
Experience ,013** ,005 2,688 ,009 ,991 1,009 
ExecPerFix 
Director Links 
-,027* 
,229* 
 
,013 
 
 
-2,106 
1,909 
 
,039 
,05 
 
,991 
,958 
 
1,009 
1,044 
 
            ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
           **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
           *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
           ᵠ. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 6. Correlational analysis results 
The results of the correlational analysis have been divided into 4 parts due to the size 
of the correlation matrix.  
Part 1. 
  DABa
lShee
t 
DACa
shFlo
w 
BoardSi-
zeLN 
BO-
DAge 
Edu-
cation 
Expe-
rience 
DABalShee
t 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
1 -,172 ,015 ,136 -,195 ,367** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 ,180 ,907 ,293 ,128 ,003 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
DACashFlo
w 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
-,172 1 ,090 ,035 ,045 ,299* 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) ,180 
 ,485 ,788 ,726 ,018 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
BoardSi-
zeNL 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
,015 ,090 1 -,311* -,205 ,008 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,907 ,485  ,014 ,111 ,949 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
BODAge Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
,136 ,035 -,311* 1 ,071 ,320* 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,293 ,788 ,014  ,584 ,011 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Education Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
-,195 ,045 -,205 ,071 1 -,257* 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,128 ,726 ,111 ,584  ,044 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Experience Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
,367*
* 
,299* ,008 ,320* -,257* 1 
57 
 
 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,003 ,018 ,949 ,011 ,044  
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
 
Part 2. 
  
Direc-
torLinks 
CEO-
Re-
munNL 
CEOPerf-
Fix 
ExecPer-
Fix 
Ned-
PerFix 
DABalSh
eet 
Pearson 
Correlation ,053 ,324
* ,418** ,590** ,050 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,682 ,010 ,001 ,000 ,697 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
DACashFl
ow 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,291* -,027 -,171 -,223 ,140 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,022 ,836 ,185 ,082 ,276 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
BoardSi-
zeNL 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,202 ,244 ,082 ,062 ,063 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,115 ,056 ,528 ,632 ,629 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
BODAge Pearson 
Correlation 
,132 -,077 -,002 -,060 ,033 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,308 ,553 ,987 ,642 ,801 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
Educati-
on 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,043 ,131 ,111 ,042 ,032 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,742 ,309 ,388 ,743 ,805 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
Expe-
rience 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,199 ,142 ,091 ,096 ,064 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,122 ,270 ,483 ,459 ,622 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
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Part 3. 
  DABal
Sheet 
DACashF
low 
Board
SizeLN 
BO-
DAge 
Edu-
cation 
Expe-
rience 
Direc-
torLin
ks 
Pearson 
Correla-
tion 
,053 ,291* -,202 ,132 -,043 ,199 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,682 ,022 ,115 ,308 ,742 ,122 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
CEO-
Re-
munN
L 
Pearson 
Correla-
tion ,324
* -,027 ,244 -,077 ,131 ,142 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) ,010 ,836 ,056 ,553 ,309 ,270 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
CEOPe
rfFix 
Pearson 
Correla-
tion 
,418** -,171 ,082 -,002 ,111 ,091 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,001 ,185 ,528 ,987 ,388 ,483 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Exe-
cPer-
Fix 
Pearson 
Correla-
tion 
,590** -,223 ,062 -,060 ,042 ,096 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,000 ,082 ,632 ,642 ,743 ,459 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Ned-
PerFix 
Pearson 
Correla-
tion 
,050 ,140 ,063 ,033 ,032 ,064 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) ,697 ,276 ,629 ,801 ,805 ,622 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 
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Part 4. 
  Direc-
torLinks 
CEORe-
munNL 
CEOPerf-
Fix 
ExecPer-
Fix 
NedPer-
Fix 
Direc-
torLink
s 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
1 ,091 -,044 -,031 ,100 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 ,482 ,736 ,808 ,442 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
CEO-
Re-
munNL 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
,091 1 ,612** ,566** ,189 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,482  ,000 ,000 ,140 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
CEOPer
fFix 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
-,044 ,612** 1 ,815** ,434** 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) ,736 ,000 
 ,000 ,000 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
Exe-
cPerFix 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
-,031 ,566** ,815** 1 ,156 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,808 ,000 ,000  ,227 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
Ned-
PerFix 
Pearson 
Correlati-
on 
,100 ,189 ,434** ,156 1 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,442 ,140 ,000 ,227  
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
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Appendix 7. Governance code in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark 
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Appendix 8. Variables of corporate governance 
The names of the companies have been coded in order to protect their anonymity. 
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Appendix 9.  Calculation of Total Net Accruals (Balance sheet method) 
The names of the companies have been coded in order to protect their anonymity. 
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Appendix 10.  Calculation of Total Net Accruals (Cash flow method)  
The names of the companies have been coded in order to protect their anonymity. 
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Appendix 11.  Remuneration of executive and non-executive team 
The names of the companies have been coded in order to protect their anonymity. 
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Appendix 12. Discretionary accruals (Balance sheet method and Cash flow method) 
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Appendix 13.  Abbreviation table 
Sr. No.  Abbreviation Full Form 
1 B.E. Board Executives 
2 DABalSheet Discretionary Accruals 
calculated using total net 
accruals given by the    
balance sheet method 
3 DACashFlow Discretionary Accruals 
calculated using total net 
accruals given by the cash 
flow method 
4 BoardSizeNL Natural Logarithm of 
Board Size 
5 BODAge Median age of the board 
of directors 
6 CEORemunNL Natural Logarithm of the 
median total                  
remuneration paid to the 
CEO 
7 CEOPerfFix Median ratio of             
performance pay to fixed 
pay of the CEO 
8 ExecPerFix Median ratio of             
performance pay to fixed 
pay of the executive team  
9 NedPerFix Median ratio of             
performance pay to fixed 
pay of non-executive di-
rectors 
10 SEC U.S. Securities and        
Exchange Commission 
 
